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вторник, 9 август 2011 г.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE ODRYSIAN KINGDOM
UNDER COTYS AND HIS SUCCESSOR TERES
[ 2nd c. BC ]


Following the ancient authors [Polyb. 23. fr. 8; Liv. 39. 53. 12-15] Philip V [221-179 B. C.] invaded Thrace’s inland launching a military campaign against the Thracian ethnic communities of the Odrysai, Denteleti and Bessi, in order to draw off the attention of the Romans from his actual plans. The Macedons took deserted Philippopolis, its inhabitants having broken away to the woods, and destroyed the tilled land of the Thracians from the plains thus forcing them to surrender. The Macedon king deployed a garrison in Phlippopolis - soon driven away by the Odrysai - and decided to found a polis in Deuriopus, one of the Paionian districts near the river of Erigon [today’s Cherna Reka] flowing from Illyria through Paionia and running into the Axios, not far from the ancient settlement of Stobis. The newly founded polis was named Perseida, after and in honour of Perseus [179-168 B.C.]. 1
The military campaign of Philip V to the inland of Thrace is traditionally dated back to 183 BC, though B. Gerov referred it to 184 BC. 2 In the very same 183 BC, most likely, the Odrysai, under the command of Cotys, son of Seuthes, managed to drive away the Macedonian garrison from Philippopolis.
Polybius [Polyb. 23. fr. 8] records: Soon afterwards this garrison (the Macedonian) was driven away by the Odrysai, who had broken their loyalty to the king (i.e. Philip V) [comp. Liv. 39. 53. 14].
The operation of the Macedonian king in Thrace was first and foremost demonstrative - thereby the dynast intended to gain recognition and respect among the Thracian rulers on the eve of the impending war with the Roman Republic, i.e. Philip V was seeking to strengthen his authority among the Thracian ethnic communities – he had had considerable influence among them already since the end of the 3rd century BC, but he had not managed to achieve a position of stability.
Some modern researchers3 consider that the Thracian ethnonyms mentioned by the ancient authors do not exactly specify any particular ethnic communities – they rather seem to bear certain geopolitical contents – practically, the authors of these sources are alluding to the Thracians inhabiting the area of the Rhodope mountains, the upper and the lower reaches of the Hebros, as well as the upper reaches of the river Strymon.
The results of the military campaign definitely showed the Macedon ruler that he should not expect too much from his Thracian allies - the Thracian dynasts were plainly demonstrating the intention to pursue their own military-political course trying to profit from the forthcoming military operations in the European Southeast.
After a period of military-political and economic crisis the Odrysai once again gained an active and bright ruler by the accession of Cotys to the throne, the latter being explicitly specified by Livy as son of Seuthes ‘... uenerat eodem Cotys ... [Liv. 42. 51. 10] and (beforehand) as king: “Cotys Thrax, Odrysarum rex …“ [Liv. 42. 29. 102]. Namely to Cotys, most likely, they refer the banishing of the Macedonian garrison from Philippopolis – an operation which brought him considerable authority and respect among the Thracians on the whole, and also became the reason for his ascent to the Odrysian throne. It was a phenomenon, not very often occurring among the Odrysai and the Thracians in general – a son to inherit his father to the throne – as they did not practice the tradition of royal succession, though ambitions and attempts of certain rulers to declare their sons heirs to the throne have been recorded.
Polybius was the first author to mention Cotys [Polyb. 27. fr. 12], the information being referred to 171/170 BC. He [Polyb. 30. fr. 17] also invests him as king βασιλεύς with respect to the events from the end of the Third Macedonian War [171-168 BC] related to 167 BC. Yet, as already mentioned above, Cotys must have ascended to the Odrysian throne most probably about 183 BC, after managing to drive away the Macedonian garrison from Philippopolis, or a little later. An evidence in support of this assumption may be the observed intensifying military-political activities of the ethnic community, obviously due to the dynastic changes within the Odrysian royal house.4 This, on its part, could mean, that during the III Macedonian War Cotys must have ruled durably and authoritatively enough to represent such a relevant factor in its course, as ancient written sources hold. He seems to have been sure enough of his (own) potential as he agreed to admit Perseus, who was forced to leave Macedonia after his brother Demetrius’ execution in 180 BC, in order to escape the rage of the repenting Philip V, thus opposing the Macedonian king himself [Liv. 40. 56. 1-2, 7].
This fact should be considered when analyzing the friendly relations between Cotys and Perseus during the III Macedonian War – they have dated namely since that time; during that very war the Odrysian king was the most relevant Macedonian ally. Besides, no wonder that the operation of the Sapai ruler Abrupolis in 179 BC was the only military reaction of the Thracians on the occasion of the death of Philip V and his son Perseus’ accession to the throne, known to contemporary researchers [Polyb. 22. fr. 18; Liv. 42. 13. 6]. For his unimpeded ascent to the Antigonid throne the new Macedonian ruler owed a lot to the Odrysian king and his indisputable authority and respect among the Thracian dynasts. Good bilateral ties in 180 BC were yet to bring their positive impact and results to Perseus.
At the beginning of the III Macedonian War Perseus’ army numbered ca. 39 000 soldiers, 21 000 of them being phalangites and 4 000 – Macedonian and Thracian cavalrymen. Another 2 000 elite Odrysian soldiers [cavalry and infantry – 1000 soldiers each] were under the command of Cotys [the Odrysian warriors practically constituted ¼ of Perseus’ whole cavalry], and the rest of the soldiers were mercenaries including a large number of Celts. The Macedonian king could also rely on the back-up of the Paioni led by Didas.
The Roman troops were under the command of Consul Publius Licinius Crassus and amounted to about 40 000 men, and some additional 10 000 Numidian, Ligurian, Hellenic, Cretan and Pergamon military units.
Perseus did not dispose of a war navy, because according to the terms of the Peace Treaty entered into at the end of the Second Macedonian War [200-197 BC] the Antigonid dynasty should not possess war ships; so it was only on the eve of the III Macedonian War that Perseus thoroughly began to outfit a shipyard in Thessalonike, whereas the Romans could count on 40 (deck) ships with landing troops of about 10 000 men under the command of Gaius Lucretius [Liv. 42. 31. 2-7; 42. 32. 6; 42. 51. 3-11; 42. 52. 11; Eutr. 4. 6. 2 ].
Publius Licinius Crass deployed a strong military unit in Illyria to keep the western Macedonian border under (immediate) threat, while he was advancing ahead of the main Roman military forces on the traditional road from Apollonia to Thessaly [Liv. 42. 36. 8-9].
The Macedonian king did not attempt to block the passage through which the Roman troops were marching up – he rather decided to get in Perebia expecting to meet Publius Licinius Crass in the foothills of Ossa, near Syukyurion [Liv. 42. 53. 5-9; 42. 54. 1-11; 42. 55. 1-9; 42. 56. 1-10; 42. 57. 1-12].
The first battle of the III Macedonian War took place in 171 BC at the foot of mount Callinicus near Larissa, involving cavalry and lighter troops (peltasts). Cotys, the Odrysian king, defeated the Italics’ horse led by Gaius Licinius Crass, brother of Consul Publius Licinius Crass, and Perseus on his part put to rout the Thessaly cavalry [Liv. 42. 58. 1-14; 42. 59. 1-11; Eutr. 4. 6. 3].
Livy [ Liv. 42. 59. 2] wrote: “First and foremost the Thracians, like wild beasts that have been kept caged for a long time, attacked with such a frenzy and such a violent roar the right wing, where the Italics cavalry were fighting, that the latter, known as a people fearless by nature and steeled in battles, were thrown into confusion and dismay.” Roman casualties in this fight amounted to ca. 2000 infantrymen and 200 horsemen, and ca. 600 warriors were taken prisoners-of-war; Perseus lost 40 foot soldiers and 20 cavalrymen. A particularly imposing scene must have represented the Thracians on their way back to the camp - carrying the heads of the killed enemies impaled on their lances, triumphantly singing a paean [Liv. 42. 60. 1-2; Plut. Ает. Paul. 9; Flor. 1. 28].
In this battle (171 BC) the Thracians for the first time met the Licinii, and this was going to have dramatic and tragic consequences for both sides. During the riots in Pergamon at the beginning of 130 BC the Roman Consul and Great Pontifex for the year 131 BC Publius Licinius Crassus Mucianus was taken prisoner-of-war by Aristonicus’ Thracian mercenaries and killed - he purposely challenged them to do this, thus not leaving the enemy the honour of keeping and triumphantly showing such a high-born prisoner to the demos.5 During the uprising of Spartacus, which shook Italy in the period 74 – 71 BC, the victorious Marcus Licinius Crass went through some very humiliating moments on the way to his goal [Plut. Crass 8-11; App. B. Civ. 1. 116-121; Eutr. 6. 7. 1]. Namely those misadventures and reverses of the Licinii became the reason for the cruel attitude of Marcus Licinius Crassus, grandson of the homonymous victor over Spartacus, to the Thracians in 29-28 BC [Liv. Per. 134-135; Dio Cass. 51. 23] - his acting did not conform to the Roman military tradition, which did not imply atrocities unjustified from military-political point of view. The very same Marcus Licinius Crass was the actual conqueror of Thrace and the Thracians south of the river Istros in 29-28 BC, this act marking the end of the military conflicts between Licinii and Thracians; the beginning has to be referred to the year 171 BC, when the talented Odrysian king Cotys overwhelmingly defeated the Italics cavalry led by Gaius Licinius Crass, a very tough adversary on the battle-field.
Very disadvantageous to Perseus was the fact that in the decisive phase of the III Macedonian War he could not completely rely on the back-up of Cotys, who had been neutralized by the moves of the skilful Roman diplomacy, carried out by means of the Thracian ruler A/u/tlezbis, A/u/tlesbis; Aulezbis; Aulesbis and the Praefectus of Eumenes II Soter [197-160 BC] and strategist of the Hellespont, Corragos, Corragum, Eumenis praefectum – under the influence of Rome and Pergamon the latter invaded the possessions of Cotys in the domain of Marena and thus distracted him from direct participation in the Roman-Macedonian military conflict. Livy wrote [Liv. 42. 67. 3-5] that, as soon as the Odrysian king heard in Thessalonike about the incursion into his own estates in the above-mentioned area in the winter of 171/170 BC, (under)taken by the Thracian dynast A(u)tlezbis and the praefect Corragos, he immediately made his way to them: Then the king decided to send Cotys off, to defend his kingdom, providing him with precious gifts on the way. His horsemen he (the king) paid their half-year earnings of 200 talents, although he originally intended to pay them for a whole year.
Perseus will obviously have thought, that as the Odrysian soldiers had to leave untimely, he was within his rights to pay them only for the time served and not for the preliminarily contracted period – that was what he considered fair, and Cotys, as king, must have taken it right in the same way.
In the ancient written tradition [Polyb. 18. fr. 9; Diod. 30. 10, 9; Liv. 44. 27. 8-12; Plut. Aem. Paul. 13; App. Mac. 18] has durably dominated the opinion of Perseus being a miser, who could not cope with this foible even in crucial moments for the fate of the Macedonian state. Besides, one should consider that due to the effective measures taken by Philip V the financial situation of the state was quite passable, but by no means brilliant. Nevertheless, in this period of vital importance to the Antagonid dynasty, the Macedon king should act more pragmatically and flexibly, and, if necessary, even pay for this the cost of (his) personal abasement.
According to Livy [Liv. 44. 26. 2-13; 44. 27. 1-7] Perseus approached in the same way the Illyrian ruler Gentius and the leader of the Bastarni, Clondicus. Appianus [App. Mac. 18. 2-3], however, considers that this was about the Getae and their chieftain Cloelius, and not about the Bastarni and Clondicus.
The Odrysian king Cotys once again proved his military skills and talent warding off the enemy’s attack and proving capable to defend the rear of the Antigonids in 170 BC. This gave Perseus the opportunity to launch a campaign against the Dardani in the autumn of the very same year, and in the winter – to take actions against some Illyrian ethnoi [Liv. 43. 18. 1-11; 43. 19. 1-14; 43. 20. 1-4; 43. 21. 1-9; 43. 22. 1-11; 43. 23. 1-8; Per. 43, Plut. Aem. Paul. 9 ].
The only record about the Thracian ruler A/u/tlezbis is that of Titus Livius [Liv. 42. 67. 3-5]. The author calls him Autlesbim, regulum Thracum without indicating the particular Thracian ethnos the latter has belonged to. As a result this identification led to different hypotheses among modern scientific researchers.
Referring to Livy’s information I.Todorov 6 considers that the above-mentioned incursion into the Odrysian lands should be related to the domain of Marena – according to the author this must have been the area around Maroneia, which gives him the reason to assume that the above Thracian ruler has probably belonged to the ethnos of the Sapai, as the raid against the territories ruled by Cotys was launched very close to the lands of the Sapai. Under these circumstances A(u)tlezbis might (really) be the successor of the Sapai ruler Abrupolis, disappeared after his incidental mention in the ancient sources; Abrupolis, like his predecessor, had been trying to profit from the complicated military-political situation in the European Southeast.
Anyway we have to take into consideration that Marenen may (also) not have been the area around Maroneia, but some other, completely different territory under the rule of the Odrysian king Cotys.
Following Y. Kabakchiev 7 A(u)tlezbis was the ruler of the Kaeni. Although the author does not bring forward any concrete arguments for his point, he may probably be referring to some later records about the foreign-political course of the Kaeni dynasty orientated against Pergamon and favoring the Bithyni.
D. Detschew 8 is the only scientist researching on the onomastic variants of the name of this Thracian ruler with pro-Roman and pro-Pergamon orientated views, mentioned by Livy - his presence in the ancient written tradition is relatively modest, and so was his military-political relevance in Southeast Europe.
On Sptember 4 of the Roman calendar or on June 22, 168 BC according to the Julian calendar, in the afternoon, when the cattle were taken to water, the outposts of the Romans clashed with those of Perseus’ army. The horses of the Macedonian king were led by Thracian soldiers. One of them was killed by the Romans as he was trying to drive back a few stray mules wandering from the middle of the river to return to the shore. This challenged the guarding detachment of 800 Thracian warriors to rush across the river against the killers. That was how the battle, planned for the following day, began [Liv. 44. 40. 7-9].
According to Plutarchus [Plut. Aem. Paul. 18] the start of the fight was intentionally provoked by Lucius Aemilius Paulus, who ordered a horse to be galloped to the Macedons; they started against it and that marked the beginning of the battle. The same author [Plut. Aem. Paul. 18] also renders another version of the event: the start of the fight was given by the attack of the Thracians (commanded by Alexander) on the hay-conveying unit of the Romans - ca. 700 Ligurians came fiercely down upon them. The precise date of this decisive battle at Pydna is known due to the lunar eclipse forecasted by the Roman legate Gaius Sulpicius Gallus [consul to-be in 166 BC] – thus he intended to prevent the Roman soldiers from panicking because of the event [Polyb. 29. fr. 16; Liv. 44. 37. 5-9; Cic. De repub. 1. 15. 23].
Plutarch [Plut. Aem. Paul. 17] wrote, that Lucius Aemilius Paulus personally was competent in the science of celestial phenomena, so he offered at dawn a sacrifice of 20 bulls to Heracles for the well-being of the cause, but he only got a good omen at the sacrifice of the 21st bull, and (then) bearing in mind that the Romans were defending themselves; as soon as the sacrifices (?casualties) amounted to 100, sacred games were initiated. After performing the religious rites the consul adjourned to his tent waiting until late in the day for the sun not to shine straight into the eyes of his soldiers during the fight.
The Romans had hardly managed to array themselves in battle order, when they were attacked by the Macedons. The strike was so fearful that Lucius Aemilius Paulus, a warrior steeled in numerous fights, later related that he had shuddered at the sight of the assaulting Macedon phalanx [Polyb. 29. fr. 17]. The Thracian warriors [romphaiores] were just as frightful: In front were (marching) the Thracians, their look – following Nasica – suggesting (him) a real horror: huge of stature, with brightly glittering shields, wearing glaring greaves, wrapped in black chitons, they were waggling heavy iron
swords, holding them up above the right shoulder [Plut. Aem. Paul. 18]. The Roman outposts were dispersed and driven away, whereas a Peligni cohort commanded by Sallius [recruited among the upper-Italics bellicose Sabinian ethnos of the Peligni] was almost entirely destroyed, though having bravely fought. The legions had to retreat up to a height near their camp. Fortunately (to the Romans), the rush of the phalanx was troubled by the uneven ground - this resulted in a break in its ranks and enabled the flexible Roman soldiers to penetrate into the appeared gaps. After some successful maneuvers of the Romans the Macedonian phalanx was taken in flank and in the rear [Liv. 44. 41. 1-9; Plut. Aem. Paul. 18-22; Plut. Reg. et imр. apophteg. 198. 79. 5 B; Eutr. 4. 7. 1; Zon. 9. 22]. The positions of Perseus on the battle field became critical. The cavalry which might be able to defend the phalanx could not cope with this fateful task and withdrew from the fight. Besides, the conduct of the Odrysian king Cotys during the battle at Pydna is considered to have been at least ambiguous. Perseus himself gave in to the panic as well, ingloriously abandoning his soldiers [according to some sources the Macedon king was wounded] and fleeing to Pella. On his way through the Pierian wood, escorted by the sacred cavalry unit, he was shortly followed by Cotys and the Odrysian horse of about 1000 men. At nightfall Perseus and his closest people turned off the road and got to Pella, there being received by Euktos and Euleas, the supervisors of Pella, the royal treasury and family; they both blamed the king for his acting at Pydna and afterwards; he got angry about this and they were killed on his order. At night Perseus and his attendance left Pella, crossed the river Axios and headed for Amphipolis [Polyb. 29. fr. 17; Liv. 44. 42. 1-3; 44. 43. 1-8; Vell. Pat. 1. 9. 4; Plut. Aem. Paul. 23].
Actually the destiny of the glorious Macedonian Kingdom was decided within less than an hour. In the battle at Pydna were sabred ca. 3 000 phalangites, the total of Perseus’ killed soldiers amounting to 20 000, and 11 000 men were taken prisoners-of-war; a considerable part of the killed Macedonians were foot soldiers; the horse practically did not suffer heavy losses and withdrew in relatively good condition.Trying to save themselves Perseus’ soldiers rushed to the river hoping to find salvation on the ships, which - as they had noticed, were lowering boats into the water. Yet, they were not taken prisoners, as they hoped - they were killed instead, and those attempting to escape back on the shore were trampled (down) by the elephants [Liv. 44. 42. 4-9; Eutr. 4. 7. 1].
According to the authors cited by Plutarchus [Plut. Aem. Paul. 21] - Poseidonios and Nasica - the Roman losses in the fight at Pydna were respectively 100 and 80 men. Th. Mommsen 9 writes: It looks like the phalanx themselves, fighting their last battle at Pydna, wanted to perish (namely) there.
On the 15th day after taking the command Lucius Aemilius Paulus put an end to the III Macedonian War – practically all the Macedonian lands were conquered within 2 days. On the second day after the defeat at Pydna the Macedonian king and his attendance arrived in Amphipolis. Yet, they were not warmly met by the locals; besides, the letter which the king himself had sent to Lucius Aemilius Paulus had not been well-received; and, finally - his attempt to get in touch with the Thracian community of the Bisalti, hoping through them (and Thrace) to be granted asylum by the Odrysian king Cotys, had failed [Liv. 44. 45. 1-14; Plut. Aem. Paul. 23]. Hence Perseus was compelled to leave Amphipolis. Crossing the Thasian apoikia Galespos east of the Strymon mouth, and the very island of Thasos he headed to the island of Samothrace attended by his closest confidants, the Cretan Evandros, the Aitolian Archedemos, the Boeot Neon and ca.150 Cretan freelances, also carrying with him his treasure amounting to about 2 000 talents. There he hoped to find shelter and protection at the sanctuary of the Kabiri [Liv. 44. 45. 15; 44. 46. 10; Vell. Pat. 1. 9. 4; Flor. 1. 28; Plut. Aem. Paul. 23]. In the meantime the Romans fleet commander Gnaeus Octavius arrived on the island of Samothrace, but, due to his respect for the gods, he did not dare to disturb the sanctity of Perseus’ refuge [Liv. 45. 5. 1-8; Vell. Pat. 1. 9. 5; Plut. Aem. Paul. 26]. Just at the same time Perseus, fearing that Evandros might possibly reveal some of their secrets, ordered the latter to be put to death. This act made him still more isolated, being now abandoned even by his guards and closest people [Liv. 45. 5. 9-12, 45. 6. 1]. Yet, he managed somehow to arrange it with a Cretan named Oroandos to take him and his family on board the ship. The Cretan however did not stick to the arrangement – arriving at the agreed time and the place, Perseus saw the ship sail away with the royal treasury. This is at least what ancient written sources have recorded [Liv. 45. 5. 2-6; 7, 1; Plut. Aem. Paul. 26].
As already mentioned above, Perseus’ desperate attempt to find a safe haven at Cotys failed. The Odrysian king had soberly assessed the sudden change of the military-political situation in Southeast Europe and complied with the new reality. Having re-orientated his foreign-political course he was already making plans how to clear himself with the Romans about his acting in the III Macedonian War. Cotys must have had a good reason to hope for indulgence on the part of the Romans being fully aware of the fact, that after the defeat of the Macedonian Kingdom, his own kingdom represented the only stable factor in the region able to play the role of the Antigonid dynasty, i.e. to be a barrier against unwanted barbarian invasions from the north into the newly-conquered territories. By his conduct and actions the Odrysian king clearly showed that, besides his military talent, he also possessed a real flair for politics, which helped him survive in this fairly complicated situation.
About the personality of the Odrysian king Polybius recorded as follows [Polyb. 27. fr. 12]: Cotys was a remarkable man, both as regards his imposing figure and his excellent military skills. And as to his spirit, he was everything but a Thracian, his behaviour being reasonable, calm and deeply noble. Diodorus added to this more [Diod. 30. 3] - that he also possessed a sense of responsibility in friendship. The Romans, however, still remembered the battle at the foot of mount Callinicus in 171 BC, so Bitius, the son of the Odrysian king, was taken hostage for a short period to the Italics city of Carseoli [Liv. 45. 42. 5-12].
Polybius’ record does not clearly specify when exactly Bitius was taken hostage to Macedonia – this may possibly have happened by 181 BC in Amphipolis, when Perseus received a group of Thracian hostages; yet, it may also have happened in the course of the (III Macedonian) war – as a step meant to hinder his father, the king, from acting in the military-political situation at that moment.
Referring to the above-mentioned Polybius [Polyb. 30. fr. 17] wrote: The Romans, who thought to have achieved their primary goal coming off victorious from the war with Perseus, and considered that continuing the hostility to Cotys would be pointless, allowed the latter to get back his son - who had been taken hostage to Macedonia together with Perseus’ sons - wishing thus to show themselves gentle and generous, and – at the same time – to win Cotys over to their side by this deed.
Perseus, who did not cherish too much hope and expectations - the Consul having refused to receive his letter - because in it he had improperly been addressed as a king - put his greatest trust on Publius Cornelius Nasica, but the latter was far away from Samothrace at that time. Hence, compelled by the circumstances, the Macedonian king together with the heir to the throne Philip, surrendered to Gnaeus Octavius, who took them to the Consul [Liv. 45. 6. 10-12; Vell. Pat. 1. 9. 5; Plut. Aem. Paul. 26; Eutr. 4. 7. 2]. To Lucius Aemilius Paulus fell the honor to receive the highest-born and glorious prisoner-of-war, who had ever faced a Roman military commander. The Macedonian ruler died in exile in the Italics city of Alba Fucens, situated by the Fucinus Lake, 102 km away northeast of Rome following the Valerian road (Via Valeria) - thereto he was sent by Quintus Cassius together with his son Alexander [Liv. XLV, 42, 2-4]. After some time the Senate banished the Numidian king Syphax to the same place, too, as well as the king of the Averni Bituitus [Liv. 30. 17. 2; Per. 61].
But where was Philip at this time, the ancient authors having recorded him attending his father at the moment of his delivery to the mercy of Lucius Aemilius Paulus? With reference to this Livy [Liv. 45. 6. 10; Diod. 29. 25 (28)] observes, that the Thessalian Ion also gave up to Gnaeus Octavius the young(er) children of Perseus, leaving only his eldest son Philip with him.
Yet, did matters really stand this way, or was the Roman written tradition trying to put an end to the Antigonid dynasty prematurely, before it had actually come? Were the fear and threat coming from Macedonia so strongly perceived within the Roman Senate as sources present it? The death of the Macedonian king is dated back to 165 or 162 BC. Velleius Paterculus [Vell. Pat. 1. 11] mentions that the ruler died about 4 years after being exiled. According to Plutarchus [Plut. Aem. Paul. 3], to keep their word about saving his life, but, at the same time, to revenge themselves as well, the Romans murdered the Macedonian king (by) depriving him of sleep – Perseus could not endure the Roman guards inventing any possible wiles to keep him awake. Two of his children died too, but Alexander lived for a long time in Rome conscientiously working as a humble clerk.
In fact the Odrysian king Cotys was the only Roman adversary in the III Macedonian War, who was not only treated with indulgence, but (who) also drew some profits. The reason for this attitude of the Romans has already been mentioned above – the Odrysian Kingdom was the only state organization capable to guarantee the Roman military-political interests in the region. Hence that is why the banishment of Bitius after the battle at Pydna in 168 BC to the Italics city of Carseoli was short in time, the latter being soon afterwards returned to his home country. On their part the Odrysian envoys stated before the Senate that Cotys had provided help to Perseus not of his own will, but because he was compelled to give him some of his people as hostages; they also said, they were ready to take the Thracian exiles out of pledge, at a cost determined by the senators. The Romans in their turn answered that they still remembered the friendly relations to Cotys, to his predecessors and the Thracians – yet, the hostages taken by Perseus could not be considered some kind of exculpation for the Odrysian king – to the contrary, they rather blamed him, since the Odrysians must hardly have had any particular reasons to fear the Antigonids, neither in years of peace, nor in periods of military conflicts with the Roman Republic. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that Cotys had preferred the alliance with Perseus to the friendship with the Roman people, the senators - guided by their virtue, and not by resentment, were returning him his son and the other Thracian hostages without redemption. So the members of the Odrysian delegation sent by Cotys to Rome received 2 000 asses each [Liv. 45. 42. 5-12]. That was usual practice of the Roman Senate, (mostly) designed to cover the expenses of the envoys during their stay in Rome.
For the significance of the Odrysian king to the Roman senators speaks also the fact that three eminent Roman politicians were sent on diplomatic mission to him – Titus Quinctius Flamininus, Gaius Licinius Nerva and M. Caninius Rebilus. Their errand was to set the parameters of the alliance agreement between the Roman Republic and the Odrysian Kingdom [Liv. 45. 42. 11].
In its essence the proceeding of the Romans represented an act of international recognition of the power of the Odrysian king, the Senate clearly considering the fact that in case of need the military power of the Odrysians and the undeniable fighting skills of their ruler might be used against the Attalids. At the same time the strengthening of Cotys’ political positions after the III Macedonian War was expected to parry the separatist trends of the Thracian dynasties apart. This was however a temporary situation and did not seem to be a tendency of Thrace’s development in the period of Late Hellenism. Source data do not clearly specify when the friendly relations between the Odrysians and the Roman Republic, recorded by Livy, exactly began; they must have shaped up most likely in 190 BC [Liv. 38. 41. 12-15] as the Roman army under the command of Lucius Cornelius Scipio and Publius Cornelius Scipio marched through the Thracian lands during the Syrian War [192–188 BC].
Maybe it is the right place here to make a well-founded guess: It seems very probable, that after his defeat at Pydna in 168 BC, Perseus may have tried to get in touch with the Thracian ethnos of the Bisalti seeking explicitly their immediate support, and not attempting – through them - to reach the Odrysian king, who was supposed to take up a new foreign-political course at that time.
The Bisalti have been first evidenced by Herodotus [Hdt. 8. 116] with respect to the Achaemenidan campaigns to Hellas – the author refers to an anonymous king of theirs [king of the Krestoni as well], who had blinded his six sons, because they did not obey his orders and joined the Persian king Xerxes (486–464 BC). Herodotus [Hdt. 6. 26] also mentiones Bisaltes, son of Apollophanes of Abydos. Athenaeus [Athen. 12. 520d-f], citing the logographer Charon of Lampsakos, adduces the Bisalti commander Naris from the first half of the Vth century BC, who had been sold in his childhood as a slave to a barber’s shop in Cardia; later on, hearing that the Bisalti were up to attack the polis, he returned to them in his home land (Bisaltia), took over the leadership of the planned action and won over the inhabitants of Cardia making their horses dance.
The ethnonym has been stable in time; there are coin emissions of the Bisalti evidenced as well, dated back to the period between the end of the VIth and the beginning of the Vth century BC.10 The Bisalti were neighboring the Krestoni, the lands inhabited by this Thracian ethnic community being localized along the lower course of the Strymon, which represented their stable border to the east, whereas to the west they most likely controlled parts of today’s Bogdanska Voyna and the Bolbe Lake. Their borders to the north must have stretched up to the Belasitsa mountain of today, from where they could contact the Medi and the Deroni.
According to Herodotus [Hdt. 7. 115] the lands around the coastal polis of Argilus and its adjacent territory were known as Bisaltia. Titus Livius [Liv. 45. 29. 6-7; 45. 30. 3] considered also Heraclea Sintica [near the present village of Zervokhori, Greece] belonging to Bisaltia, situated on the west shore of the Strymon; to the above author the Bisalti were quite a brave people, inhabiting the area of Macedonia Prima. After the military-political efflorescence of the Macedonian Kingdom and the subsequent territorial expansion the lands of the Bisalti fell under Macedonian rule, after the battle at Pydna (168 BC) being included into Macedonia I.
A decree [Silloge 3 656], traditionally dated back to 166 BC, provides information about the stir-up of a territorial argument between Cotys and Abdera. The Odrysian ruler took advantage of the favorable situation in the European Southeast after the III Macedonian War and penetrated into the lands up to Abdera, thus conquering some areas belonging to the polis. The resulted controversy had to be managed by the Senate in Rome, patrons (of the interests) of Abdera being two proxies (proxenii) of the polis in Teos, Abdera’s metropolis.
To what extent the inhabitants of the polis managed to parry the invasion of the Odrysians and whether the envoys from Teos achieved their goal of persuading the senators to make a decision favourable to Abdera remains uncertain. In modern history literature11 dominates the view that the Odrysian ruler succeeded in asserting his positions, all the more the actions taken by him were detrimental to the Attalids. This conduct was in complete correspondence with the political line of the Roman Republic after the battle at Pydna (168 BC) to tolerate operations of this kind. Teos was under the rule of Eumenes II Soter, so the envoys to Rome will most likely have acted on the latter’s suggestion.
I. Todorovs 12 opinion is that the Odrysian operation against Abdera should not be overrated, as Cotys’ apparently successful moves were to a large extent directly depending on the outcome of the struggle between the Roman Republic and Macedonian Kingdom; so the fact that, after the attempt of Cotys to conquer Abdera there are no more records in the ancient sources about any further actions or appearance of his or of his son, indicates a momentary lack of perspective in the political line of the Odrysian king.
Cotys himself must have died shortly after this, and Bitius tried to continue his father’s pro-Roman policy. Yet, this foreign-political course was not acceptable to a great part of the Odrysian aristocracy - they managed to enthrone Teres, the other son of Cotys, married to a daughter of the Macedonian king Philip V and not sharing his father’s (and brother’s) pro-Roman views.
The source data evidence that the Odrysian king Cotys was an ally of the Antigonid dynasty, and not their subject, i.e. they maintained neighborly relations of plain political interests. 13
M. Hatzopoulos 14 is one of the few contemporary historians holding that Cotys was subject to the Macedonian Kingdom, which - following this author, by 168 BC must have reached up to the river Hebros to the east.
The brilliant characteristic of the Odrysian ruler recorded by Polybius is most likely a result of their common fortunes after the III Macedonian War – it represents a rare digression from ancient authors’ generally stereotype descriptions of rulers fighting against the Roman Republic.
E. Condurachi 15 seems to be the only modern researcher trying to overshadow to some extent the image of Cotys rendered by Polybius and Diodorus – he compares the relations between the ruler and the Romans to those between Yugurta and the Roman Republic.
Cotys’ royal titling implies a particular connotation; nevertheless, it seems difficult to maintain the view of a centralized state life (organization) in Southeast Thrace during the late-Hellenistic period with the Odrysian royal house atop. The records about the existence of Thracian dynasts able to make independent military-political decisions are explicit, i.e. the tendency towards a political decentralization of state life among the Thracian ethnic communities went deeper, being also stimulated by the military operations of the Romans in the European Southeast. During the IInd - Ist century BC in Thrace came to the fore more and more single Thracian rulers not disposing of appreciable military-political power. Even the monarchic institution itself grew futureless within the Hellenistic world, although particularly in Thrace, it managed to match somehow with the Roman administration in the provinces for a certain period later.
Modern researchers are making attempts to re-date the above epigraphic document 16, the latter being traditionally referred to 166 BC. This has been undertaken basing on the fact that the two envoys of Teos to Rome meant to defend the interests of Abdera, are defined as πάτρωνας , which was impossible by 146 BC, when patronage in international relations was for the first time evidenced. The term is however mainly an equivalent formula, under which the proxies of Abdera to Teos defending the Attalid interests were considered by the Roman Senate. 17
Cotys struck two types of bronze coins of small denomination. The obverse side of the coins of the first type bears the image of Artemis, with the hair lifted and curled over her forehead as a diadem; the reverse side shows a horse walking right. The second type is, for the time being, represented by one piece - its obverse represents a male head with long hair and a sharp-featured, protruding chin in right profile, and the reverse - a horse walking left. Following the opinion of Y. Yourukova 18 these are the individualized specific characteristics of Cotys’ portrait representation, but due to the small size of the coin flan and the awkwardness of the engraver there are no other details to be distinguished. Modern scientists19 have made the guess, that owing to the rarity of these coins their mintage must have been limited in time and volume, and in the quality of a royal realia they are of a pronounced propaganda character, since the representation of a horse in quiet pace or galloping is a typical mark of the bronze coins of Philip V and Perseus.
After the operation in 166 BC against Abdera the Odrysian king Cotys is not being mentioned anymore in the ancient sources – this fact might suggest the idea that the latter must either have died a natural death, or been eliminated by the anti-Roman [Odrysian] aristocratic circles not sharing his political orientation. As already mentioned above, his son Bitius was caught up by the same fate. Thus the throne was placed at the disposal of Cotys’ other son, Teres, married to an anonymous daughter of Philip V, and being of anti-Roman political orientation, he might readily support Andriskos’ plans [Diod. exc. 16].
At first the pretender to the Macedonian throne Andriskos arrived in Byzantium, where he was welcomed as a son of a king. This gave a reason to doubts related to the question whether Oroandos was not, after all, implementing the (terms of the) agreement with the Macedonian king. And, also, to what extent could the revelations of Perseus’ concubine Callipa about Andriskos’ royal birth be taken for truth on the eve of the Fourth Macedonian War [149–148 BC] ?
Diodorus’ records clearly indicate that the pretender to the throne in Pella had strong positions in Macedonia and Thrace. Maybe he has (really) belonged to the Antigonid dynasty, as stated by Pausanias [Paus. 7. 13. 1]? Oroandos, who stole Perseus’ treasury, was Cretan, and complying with the information of the ancient authors Andriskos is said to have been brought up by a Cretan.
One should take into consideration that by means of the evidenced act Byzantium has given up pursuing its traditional foreign policy of neutrality, although after the first defeat of Andriskos the Byzantines withdrew their support to him fearing eventual Roman actions of retaliation or possible economic consequences.
Byzantium would hardly venture that credulously on undertaking such a drastic act, unless the polis leadership trusted Andriskos’ gentility. On his part Andriskos considered that his plan could be brought to a successful end, solely if he managed to get over to Thrace and win the Thracian dynasts over to his mission. In Thrace Andriskos was given a solemn reception by the Odrysian ruler Teres - as to a person of royal birth. Teres put on his head a wreath symbolizing a royal diadem and referred to him the command of the army. The Odrysian king could afford this gesture being the only ruler alive closely related (by marriage) to the Antigonid dynasty, by this act formally acknowledging Andriskos’ royal birth. Actually, the ceremony performed by Teres attached certain legitimacy to the pretensions of Andriskos; the latter was also given 100 soldiers and a reference to other Thracian rulers, who offered him more mercenaries and sent him over to the Thracian dynast Barsabas [Diod. exc. 16].
Among the Thracian rulers rendering assistance to Andriskos only Barsabas was not anonymous; his belonging to a particular Thracian ethnos is however not specified by the ancient authors. Because of the laconism of the sources, they provide no precise information about the particular Thracian ethnic communities supporting Andriskos in his undertaking. It is however recorded that in Thrace he has managed to recruit a considerable army involving the independent ethnic groups and dynasts, not doing well under Roman rule [Diod. exc. 16; Zon. 9. 28].
Some contemporary researchers20 presume that ancient authors are alluding to the independent [autonomous] Thracians, who were localized in Antiquity in difficult-of-access areas in the Rhodope and the Haemus mountains. In any event, the number of the Thracian dynasts supporting Andriskos’ plans must have been considerable – unfortunately, their proper names are not specified in the ancient sources.
Florus [Flor. 1. 30] explicitly observes that the pretender to the Macedonian crown was powerful, because he could rely not only on Macedonian support, but also on a considerable military force of Thracian auxiliary troops. Andriskos penetrated in Thrace through the domain later called and known as Astike, meeting Teres in Byzia, one of the old Odrysian royal residences; from there, heading across the northern part of the Agrianes Valley and through the passes of the Korpili and the Sapai he got into Macedonia Prima.
A part of the modern researchers 21 consider it impossible to penetrate in Thrace through the areas adjacent to the Thracian Chersonesus, because at that time they were controlled by the ruler of the Kaeni, Diegilis; in case there have been any contacts between the latter and Andriskos, the ancient authors would certainly have recorded them.
On his part Diegilis was too busy with military operations against the Attalids in the Thracian Chersonensus, so he could hardly afford additionally venturing on the participation in Andriskos’ risky undertaking. It appears more probable that the pretender to the Macedonian throne rather complied with the actions taken by Diegilis, than vice versa.
The proper name Teres is evidenced by Diodorus [Diod. exc. 16]. Teres appears as son of Cotys and successor (to the throne), married to a daughter of Philip V. The above marriage was supposedly contracted during the lifetime of the Macedonian king. Yet, this is (still) a debatable point, since it also seems fully possible the marriage between Teres and the anonymous high-born Macedonian princess to have been contracted after the death of Philip V (179 BC) as part of the active diplomatic moves of Perseus: his marriage to Laodice, daughter of Seleucus IV Philopatros [187-175 BC], and his sister Apama’s marriage to the Bithynian king Prusias II Cynegus [182 – 149 BC]. At all events, however, Teres married into the Antigonid dynastic family not later than 167 BC.
Diodorus is the only author providing information – although brief – about the Thracian ruler Barsabas [Diod. exc. 16]. According to the view of Ch. Danov 22 Barsabas belonged to the Thracian regulus supporting and attending Andriskos in his march to Macedonia. I. Todorov 23 on his part considers that Barsabas is among the Thracian rulers who are hard to give a more detailed historical characterization. He might very well have been only an Odrysian paradynast conscientiously fulfilling the orders of the Odrysian king Teres.
After the initial success Andriskos’ adventure naturally failed. Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus managed to assault his outpost by surprise - the act caused panic among the rest of the army and they went on the run. Andriskos showed an enviable will for fight, and being defeated by the Romans for the second time he fled again to Thrace. He took shelter in the lands of the Thracian dynast Byuzu hoping to receive assistance from the Thracian rulers and try once more his fortune, though deprived of any direct contacts to his allies and no longer able to count on well-armed troops, his second failure having led to the withdrawal of a great part of the Thracian dynasts from him [Zon. 9. 28]. The Odrysians returned to the foreign-political course pursued by Cotys and his son Bitius, eliminating Teres - most likely at the request of the Romans, and certainly not simply overlooking the misdeeds of the Byzantines [Diod. exc. 16; Zon. 9. 28; Tac. Ann. 12. 62]. Having allowed themselves in a period to provide help to Andriskos, they hardly saw any reason for treating Teres more indulgently - his pronounced anti-Roman position and direct (family) relationship to the Antigonid dynasty were enough to determine his fate, particularly considering the fact that he might any moment have become a promoter of anti-Roman sentiments in the European Southeast.
After the end of the IV Macedonian War in the region took place material changes. Thrace was most likely caught up in a dynastic crisis – yet, these events still appear a bit vague to modern researchers, mainly as a result of the laconism of ancient written sources. It seems however certain that the change of the political situation in Thrace around the mid-second century BC has contributed to the rising of the dynastic house of the Kaeni.
The Byzantine author Ioan Zonaras [Zon. 9. 28] is the only author noting that Byuzu gave up Andriskos to the Romans obviously meaning to fawn on the victors, but also for fear of them. The name of the Thracian ruler who delivered Andriskos to the Romans was evidenced by Dio Cassius; yet, the information remained preserved thanks to the excerpts of Ioan Zonaras, where he is being titled a dynast.
I. Todorov 24 considers that the common root of the name of the above Thracian ruler Βύζου; Βύζαζ; Βύζηζ and that of the state center of the Asti Βιζύη; Βιζόη; Βύζη unambiguously indicates his belonging to the Thracian ethnos of the Asti. It seems however more probable that Byuzu – like Barsabas, was an Odrysian paradynast – yet, unlike the latter, he did not stay loyal to the Odrysian king Teres who was losing ground. After the end of the IVth Macedonian War Byuzu, relying on Roman protection, eliminated Teres succeeding (him) to the throne and re-orientating the Odrysian foreign policy anew towards the Roman Republic.
The military-political events in the first half of the 2nd c. BC strengthened the positions of the Roman Republic as a leading factor in the ancient world. This was not so much a result of the growing ambitions of the Romans, but rather a consequence of some mean controversies among the Hellenistic rulers and their political shortsightedness. In most cases Roman interference in the Eastern Mediterranean came only at the explicit insistence of particular Hellenistic rulers, the adroit Roman diplomacy embracing the opportunities in the best possible way - Rome accessed already burst-out military conflicts cautiously assessing which of the belligerent sides might pose a threat henceforth. As a result of this involvement the Hellenistic monarchies became dependent in their foreign policy and practically had to comply with Roman interests.
If during the 3rd century BC Thrace was considered a heritage of Lysimachus and for various political and historical reasons exposed to the conquest attempts of Seleucids, Ptolemaics and Antigonids, in the first half of the 2nd century BC the Odrysian dynasty became again an equipollent participant in international military-political relations. Merely the Antigonids and the Attalids were still competing for the right to control the coastal settlements on the Aegais and the Propontis – yet, this was already going on under the supervision of the Roman Republic.
The Odrysian dynastic house, having during the rule of Cotys and his son Bitius for a short time re-orientated their foreign policy towards pro-Roman position, up to the enthroning of Cotys’ other son, Teres, was still the most authoritative factor in Thrace. Through diplomatic moves within the complicated international situation in the late Hellenistic period they were attempting to resist the pretensions of certain external powers to rule over parts of the Thracian lands; at the same time they were also trying to overcome the oppressive tendencies of decentralization and to ensure an outlet on the Propontis and the Aegais.
As regards the very essence of the individuality of the Odrysian king Cotys the analysis of the source data shows that it is about a talented Hellenistic ruler, diplomat and warrior, about whom the ancient authors did not spare of their praises, though generally not often doing this when referring to Thracian rulers. Considering also the complicated military-political situation in Southeast Europe during the first half of the 2nd century BC, in which Cotys, son of Seuthes, had to act, he may (should) absolutely rightfully be regarded as a worthy successor of his predecessor Cotys I [383 – 359 BC] in military-political affairs. Namely Cotys, the son of Seuthes, defeated in 171 BC on the battle-field at the foot of mount Callinicus a fearful adversary like the Italics cavalry. His son Teres staked on something else – the military-political course chosen by him is worth of respect - unfortunately however, unlike the policy of Cotys, it could not bring in any gains.
After the III Macedonian War, and particularly after the defeat of Andriskos in 149/148 BC, the conversion of Macedonia into a Roman province (146 BC) and the destruction of Corinth by Lucius Mummius Achaicus in the very same year, the Senate changed the main orientation of their foreign-policy course, thus certainly affecting the Thracian ethnic communities as well. In the Roman ruling circles were already establishing the political principles of Cato the Elder [234–149 BC], Publius Sulpicius Galba and Marcus Valerius Laevinus aiming at total military-political and economic expansion within the Mediterranean, to compensate the concept of the so-called Scipio circle grouped around Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus [235–183 BC], whose ideological adherents Titus Quinctius Flaminius and Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus the Younger based on the idea of the stepwise building of a Roman-Hellenistic koine.


List of Cited Ancient Authors:

Appianus. Bella Civilia Viereck; Roos; Mendelssohn).
Appianus. Macedonica (Viereck; Roos; Mendelssohn).
Athenaeus. Deipnosophistae (Kaibel).
Cicero. De republica (Müller; Tullius; Ziegler; Clark).
Dio Cassius C. Historia Romana (Dindorf-Melber; Boissevain).
Diodorus Siculus. Bibliotheca historicae (Vogel; Dindorf- Müller; Goukowsky).
Eutropius. Breviarium ab urbe condita (Santini).
Florus. Epitomae (Rossbach; Malcovati).
Herodotus. Historiae (Hude).
Pausanias. Graeciae descriptio (Schubart; Rocha-Pereira; Jones).
Plutarchus. Aemilius Paulus (Ziegler).
Plutarchus. Crassus (Ziegler).
Plutarchus. Regum et imperatorum aphophtegmata (Hubert).
Polybius. Historia universalis (Büttner-Wobst; Paton).
Tacitus. Annales (Koestermann).
Titus Livius. Ab urbe condita (Weissenborn-Müller- Heraeus).
Titus Livius. Periochae (Rossbach).
Velleius Paterculus. Historia Romana (Stegmann de Pritzwald; Woodman; Hellegouarc’h).
Zonaras. Epitome historiarum (Dindorf).


Notes:

1.Niese B. Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chäronea, Bd. III, Gotha, 1899, S. 29; Walbank. F Philip V of Macedon, Cambridge, 1940, p. 242-243; Danov Ch. Die Thraker auf dem Ostbalkan von der hellenistischen Zeit bis zur Gründung Konstantinopels. – In: ANRW, Berlin-New York, 1979, S. 90; Hatzopoulos M. Les polititarques de Philippopolis – In: Akten des IIIten internationalen thrakologischen Kongresses II, Wien, 1986, 141.
2.Геров Б. Проучвания върху западнотракийските земи през римско време, Част І. – In: ГСУ-ФФ. Т. LIV/3, 1959/60, с. 28; comp. Тачева М. История на българските земи в древността през елинистическата и римската епоха, Второ допълнено издание, София, 1997, с. 56 - the author conceives this march as a continuation of the military campaign of Philip V in 184 BC against the Thracians from the surroundings of Byzantion.
3.Кабакчиев Ю. Фракия и закат крупных эллинистических монархий. – In: BHR, 1-2, 1992, 8.
4.Тодоров И. Неизвестните тракийски владетели 542-798 а. и. с., Велико Търново, 1998, с. 49-50.
5.Моммзен Т. Истории Рима, Том 2, Книга 4, Москва, 2001, с. 62.
6.Тодоров И. Op. cit., p. 30.
7.Кабакчиев Ю. Op. cit., 10.
8.Detschew D. Die thrakischen Sprachreste, 2. Auflage, Wien, 1976, S. 39
9.Моммзен Т. Op. cit., Том 1, Книга 3, с. 329.
10.Папазоглу Ф. Македонски градови у римско доба, Скопие, 1957, с. 263-266 with lit.; Фол А. Политическа история на траките, София, 1972, с. 101-104 with lit.
11.Condurachi E. Kotys, Rome et Abdera. – In: Latomus, 29, 1970, 581- 594.
12.Тодоров И. Op. cit., p. 54-55.
13.Тачева М. Проблеми на тракийската политическа история (ІІ в. пр. н. е. – 45 г. от н. е.). – In: ГСУ-ИФ, 76, 1983, 54.
14.Hatzopoulos M. La politique thrace des derniers Antigonides. – In: Pulpudeva, 4, 1983, 84.
15.Condurachi E. Op. cit., 581-594.
16.Chrianky G. Rome and Cotys, two problems: 1. The diplomacy of 167 BC; 2. The date of Silloge3 656. – In: Athenaeum, 1, Nr. 3-4, 1982, 477; Тачева М. История на българските земи в древността ..., с. 61.
17.Кабакчиев Ю. Op. cit., 11-12.
18.Мушмов Н. Монетите на тракийските царе. – В: Сборник В. Дякович, София, 1927, 238, № 177 (the author specifies this type as the Head of Apollo); comp. Юрукова Й. Монетите на тракийските племена и владетели, T I, София, 1992, с. 158; Youroukova Y. Coins of the Ancient Thracians. – In: BAR Supplementary Series 4, Oxford, 1976, 24 Pl. 15 (Figs. 90-94), p. 34, Nr. 124.
19.Юрукова Й. Монетите на тракийските племена ..., с. 158-159; of the issue of the coins of Philip V and Perseus, see: Mamroth A. Die Silbermünzen des Königs Perseus. – In: Zeitschrift für Numismatika, XVIII, 1928; see Mamroth A. Die Silbermünzen des Königs Philippos V von Makedonien. – In: Zeitschrift für Numismatika, XL, 1930; see also Mamroth A. Die Bronzemünzen des Königs Philippos V von Makedonien. – In: Zeitschrift für Numismatika, XLII, 1935; see also Francke P. Zur Finanzpolitik des makedonischen Königs Perseus während des Krieges mit Rom 171-168 v. Chr. – In: JNG, VIII, 1957; Прокопов И. Тетрадрахма на Персей. – In: Нумизматика, 4, 1985, 3-5; Прокопов И. Циркулацията на бронзовите монети на Филип V и Персей в Югозападна България. – In: Нумизматика, 3, 1986, 5-20; Прокопов И. Находки на македонски монети в региона на Горна и Средна Струма от края на ІІІ до І в. пр. н. е. – In: Сб. Пауталия 85, 1986, 6-14; Драганов Д. Монетите на македонските царе. Част ІІ – от Филип ІІІ Аридей до Персей, Ямбол, 2001, с. 99-131; 180-203.
20.Мурыгина Н. Сопротивление фракийских племен римской агрессии и восстание Андриска. – In: ВДИ, 2, 1957, 80.
21.Кабакчиев Ю. Утверждение Рима в Северо-Восточном Средиземноморье и “мрачно столетие” для Фракии (170 – 70 гг. до н. э.). – In: BHR, 4, 1993, 5.
22.Danov Ch. Die Thraker ..., S. 100.
23.Тодоров И. Op. cit., p. 33.
24.Тодоров И. Op. cit., p. 33-34.

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